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 “SLICING A SHADOW”1: 
THE DEBATE OVER COMBINED REPORTING AND 
ITS EFFECT ON WISCONSIN’S BUSINESS CLIMATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A recent dispute
2
 between the Wisconsin Department of Revenue and 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. over whether Wal-Mart‘s business structure is in fact a 
tax avoidance strategy brought a familiar debate to the surface yet again: 
should Wisconsin adopt combined reporting?
3
  The case for combined 
reporting seems simple: corporations doing business in Wisconsin would be 
forced to pay their fair share of taxes to Wisconsin.  However, as the Supreme 
Court has noted, ―[a]llocating income among various taxing jurisdictions 
bears some resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow.‖4 
In 2007, the State of Wisconsin began to take notice of the way Wal-Mart 
structures itself within Wisconsin borders.
5
  Although Wisconsin‘s largest 
private employer
6
 paid $36.8 million in state and local taxes in Wisconsin in 
2008,
7
 the State believes it should be paying more.
8
  However, Wal-Mart is 
not the only corporation arguably paying less than its fair share of state taxes.  
Through a combination of tax avoidance strategies, deductions, and 
incentives, companies doing business in Wisconsin are avoiding the 
responsibility of helping support valuable state and local public services, 
leaving the burden with individuals.  In 2005, close to 50,000 corporations 
filed returns in Wisconsin, and two-thirds of those returns ―showed a bottom-
 
1. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983). 
2. See, e.g., Steven Walters & Avrum D. Lank, Wal-Mart Owes Back Taxes, State Says: Paying 
Rent to Itself Cuts Millions off Retailer’s Tax Bill, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1. 
3. Under a combined reporting regime, taxes are computed by treating all members of a unitary 
business as one, i.e., the corporate structure is ignored.  See infra Part II.A. 
4. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 192. 
5. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2.  An article that appeared on the front page of the Wall 
Street Journal in February of 2007 discussing North Carolina‘s fight to close the same loophole that 
Wal-Mart is utilizing in Wisconsin possibly motivated the Department of Revenue‘s action.  Jesse 
Drucker, Friendly Landlord: Wal-Mart Cuts Taxes By Paying Rent To Itself—Other Retailers, Banks 
Use Loophole in Rules to Lower States’ Levies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A1. 
6. Walters & Lank, supra note 2.  Wal-Mart currently employs 30,097 Wisconsin residents in 
58 Supercenters, 25 discount stores, 12 Sam‘s Clubs, and 3 distribution centers.  Wal-Mart State-by-
State Information, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/StateByState/State.aspx?id=48 (last visited 
May 28, 2009). 
7. Wal-Mart State-by-State Information, supra note 6. 
8. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2.  The Department of Revenue sought $17.7 million in 
back taxes, interest, and penalties for tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000.  Id. 
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line tax of zero dollars.‖9  As the Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future puts it, ―[i]t 
makes no sense . . . to have a tax system in which individual companies are 
able to choose as a matter of internal strategy whether or not to pay taxes.‖10 
As with most things in life, adopting combined reporting as a solution to 
tax avoidance is not as simple as it seems.  There are various considerations 
that any state proposing a change to its tax structure must keep in mind.  The 
focus of this Comment is the current state of the business climate in 
Wisconsin and how much impact the business climate rankings should have 
on discussing a change to the state tax structure given the faults of the 
structure currently in place.  Part II.A will discuss the meaning of combined 
reporting.  Part II.B will analyze the Department of Revenue‘s case against 
Wal-Mart as well as other similar tax avoidance strategies that have been 
utilized in Wisconsin.  Part II.C will focus on the current state of Wisconsin‘s 
business climate, the various rankings, and what effect the rankings should 
have on the decision to locate a business within Wisconsin‘s borders. 
Part III of this Comment will analyze Wisconsin‘s three available options 
for combating the most common tax avoidance strategies: attacking each tax 
avoidance scheme individually, passing legislation targeted at specific tax 
avoidance schemes, and adopting combined reporting.  Finally, Part IV will 
conclude that Wisconsin should seriously consider adopting combined 
reporting, as it is the most effective method for combating the various tax 
avoidance strategies, and it will help, not hurt, the business climate in the long 
run. 
II. A PRIMER ON COMBINED REPORTING AND TAX AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES 
IN WISCONSIN 
A. What is Combined Reporting? 
The three approaches currently used by states in determining corporate 
taxable income are separate accounting, formulary apportionment, and 
combined reporting.
11
  Separate accounting treats each corporate entity as a 
separate taxable entity, regardless of the interconnectedness of its dealings 
with a parent or subsidiary.
12
  It is ―based on the premise that it is both 
 
9. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, WISCONSIN‘S REVENUE GAP: AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE TAX 
AVOIDANCE 1 (2007). 
10. Id. at 12. 
11. Richard D. Pomp, State Tax Reform: Proposals for Wisconsin, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 49 
(2004). 
12. Id. at 53; see also Richard D. Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: 
Reflections (and Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 49, 60 (David 
Brunori ed., 1998) (defining separate entity states as ―[s]tates that calculate the taxable income and 
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possible and practical to isolate the taxable income of portions of the business 
that a corporation carries on within a state.‖13  Dealings between subsidiaries 
of the same parent company are treated as transactions between unrelated 
parties.  If Company A, a subsidiary of Parent Company, manufactures Good 
X and delivers it to Company B, another subsidiary of Parent Company, a 
hypothetical arm‘s length sales price, or transfer price, will need to be 
determined for tax purposes.
14
 
Separate accounting is not practical.  As the above transfer pricing 
illustration shows, determining a corporation‘s sales proceeds based on 
hypothetical prices or, as is common, by determining the price at which 
manufacturers sell comparable goods to independent distributors can be 
administratively difficult.
15
  Furthermore, the number may not reflect the 
actual proceeds or profitability of the corporation, especially when that figure 
depends on activities that are integrated with subsidiaries of the same parent.
16
  
The value of being part of a large synergistic operation cannot be fully 
conveyed through transfer prices.
17
 
Formulary apportionment and combined reporting were developed in 
response to the inherent problems with separate accounting.
18
  The current 
system in place in Wisconsin is formulary apportionment, which works as 
follows: each company uses a formula to determine the percentage that should 
be apportioned to the company‘s in-state activities or ―presence.‖19  First, the 
company uses Wisconsin law to compute its worldwide taxable income, 
which is the company‘s pre-apportionment tax base.20  Next, the company 
determines its apportionment percentage—an equation based on the 
company‘s sales, payroll, and property located in Wisconsin compared with 
 
apportionment percentage of the parent and ignore the taxable income and factors of the subsidiary, 
with which they have no connection or nexus‖). 
13. Pomp, supra note 11, at 49. 
14. Id. at 50. 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. at 50–51. 
18. Id. at 49. 
19. Id. at 51–52.  Wisconsin‘s system of apportionment was upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 229–30 (1980).  
Against Exxon Corporation‘s argument that it did not have a sufficient nexus with Wisconsin to 
permit Wisconsin to include all of Exxon‘s net income in the apportionment formula, the Court 
reiterated its long-held belief that ―‗the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as 
well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the States for tax purposes by formulas 
utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs.‘‖  Id. at 219 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. 
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 460 (1959)). 
20. WIS. STAT. § 71.25(5)(a) (2007–2008); Pomp, supra note 11, at 52. 
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the same factors on a worldwide basis.
21
  Finally, the taxable income of the 
corporation apportioned to Wisconsin is determined by multiplying its 
worldwide taxable income by the apportionment percentage.
22
 
Implicit in the adoption of formulary apportionment is the belief that 
determining a corporation‘s taxable income based on sales, payroll, and 
property is the superior method.
23
  Combined reporting is merely an extension 
of that belief.
24
  ―The central element of [the case for combined reporting] is 
that the substance of the business activities in the state should control, not the 
organizational structure of the business entity or entities conducting those 
activities.‖25 
Combined reporting is a tax regime used in almost half of the states and is 
being considered in several others.
26
  Under a combined reporting taxation 
system, taxes are determined on the parent company level; in other words, 
corporate structure is ignored.  The parent company and its subsidiaries are all 
treated as if they are part of the same unitary business.
27
 
For accounting purposes, a combined report is a ―document prepared on 
behalf of a group of corporations engaged in a unitary business.‖28  The first 
step in compiling a combined report is to determine the scope of the unitary 
business (i.e., the parent company and its subsidiaries) to determine the 
group‘s aggregate taxable income.29  Once the aggregate taxable income is 
 
21. Wisconsin Department of Revenue Form 4B: Wisconsin Apportionment Data lays out the 
apportionment formula, which includes a double-weighted sales factor.  Form 4B can be accessed on 
the Department of Revenue‘s website at http://www.dor.state.wi.us/forms/2008/08ic-043.pdf. 
22. Id.; see also Pomp, supra note 11, at 52. 
23. Pomp, supra note 11, at 52. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 53. 
26. Avrum D. Lank, Lawmakers Weigh Change in Business Taxes; Combined Reporting Could 
Bring in Millions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept., 22, 2007, at D1.  The states that have adopted 
combined reporting so far are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,  Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia.  See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS AND THE NEED FOR ―COMBINED 
REPORTING‖ 5 n.1 (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-07sfp.pdf; ROBERT M. 
NACKER, WIS. ECON. DEV. INST., WHITHER COMBINED REPORTING—AN ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT 5 
tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.weda.org/about/legislative/pdf/WEDA_Combined_Reporting_ 
02_20_08_Final.pdf.  Additionally, adopting combined reporting has been considered by Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  Id.; Giles Sutton & 
Nicholas E. Ford, The Impact of Legal Entities on the Mechanics of Unitary Reporting , in TAX 
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, 
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 118, 125 n.11 (PLI Tax Law & 
Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series No. J-770, 2007). 
27. Pomp, supra note 11, at 53–54. 
28. Id. at 54. 
29. Id.  Transactions between members of the group are usually eliminated from the 
computation of aggregate taxable income.  Id. 
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determined, the next step is to determine how much of the income the 
company should apportion to the state.  This amount is determined by 
multiplying the aggregate taxable income of the group by each member of the 
group‘s apportionment percentage.30  Each member of the unitary group that 
has a nexus within the state is taxed on its share of the unitary income 
apportioned to the state.
31
 
In contrast, states that do not use combined reporting, known as 
―[s]eparate entity states[,] treat related corporations as if they were unrelated 
strangers.‖32  This is true even with subsidiaries and their parent companies.  
The income and factors of the parent and the subsidiary have absolutely no 
effect on the tax calculations of the other.
33
  Therefore, when a corporation 
has a subsidiary located outside of the state that does not directly conduct 
business within the state, the state will not be able to collect taxes from the 
subsidiary even if the parent handles all the assets of the subsidiary. 
Doubts about combined reporting‘s constitutionality were eliminated by 
the United States Supreme Court when it upheld the use of combined 
reporting twice in the last twenty-five years, first in 1983
34
 and again in 
1994.
35
  In the first case, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 
the Court held that California‘s method of combined reporting did not violate 
the United States Constitution.
36
  Container Corp., a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Illinois, claimed California‘s use of the unitary 
business/formula apportionment method—another way of saying combined 
reporting
37—in the taxing scheme violated the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses of the Constitution.
38
  The Court disagreed, stating that while ―a State 
may not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‗tax value earned outside its 
borders,‘‖ figuring out the exact ―territorial allocation[]‖ of that value is 
difficult.
39
  Therefore, the Court concluded that each state may enforce its 
 
30. Id.  Apportionment percentage is determined by performing the apportionment formula for 
each corporation in the group.  Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 53. 
33. Id. 
34. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
35. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
36. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184. 
37. Combined reporting is a simpler way of describing the unitary business and formula 
apportionment methods described in Container Corp.  Id. at 165.  The unitary business half of the 
equation describes the process of defining the scope of the unitary business, and the formula 
apportionment half describes the process of apportioning the income of the unitary business to the 
taxing state.  Id. 
38. Id. at 162. 
39. Id. at 164. 
834 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:829 
own tax scheme, and the taxpayer must prove that the tax scheme results in 
―‗extraterritorial values being taxed.‘‖40 
In addition, the Court laid out the requirements for a constitutionally valid 
state taxing scheme that attempts to tax interstate businesses.  First, there must 
be a nexus between the taxing state and the interstate activities that gives rise 
to the tax at issue.
41
  Additionally, there must be ―‗a rational relationship 
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the 
enterprise.‘‖42  On the formula apportionment side, the first requirement is 
that the apportionment formula be fair under the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses of the United States Constitution.
43
  Fairness has two components: 
internal consistency and external consistency.
44
  Internal consistency requires 
that, if the formula were applied in every jurisdiction, the unitary business 
would be taxed on all of its income but no more.
45
  External consistency 
requires that the ―factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must 
actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.‖46  The final 
requirement is that, in addition to being fair, the apportionment formula must 
not violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate or 
foreign commerce.
47
  If a state taxing scheme does not violate any of these 
requirements, it should be immune to constitutional challenge. 
However, the Court‘s decision in Container Corp. did not end the 
constitutional challenges to combined reporting.  California‘s system was 
challenged yet again in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of 
California,
48
 but this time it was the application of the system to foreign-based 
companies that brought scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.  Barclays Bank, 
a United Kingdom corporation, challenged California‘s use of combined 
reporting to tax income attributed to Barclays within the state, arguing that the 
system ―burdens foreign-based multinationals and results in double 
international taxation.‖49  Once more the Court rejected the constitutional 
challenge, holding that ―the Constitution does not impede application of 
California‘s corporate franchise tax to Barclays.‖50  Again, the Court stated 
 
40. Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep‘t of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980)). 
41. Id. at 165–66.  In short, nexus requires that there is a ―‗minimal connection . . . between the 
interstate activities and the taxing State.‘‖  Id. (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219–20). 
42. Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219–20). 
43. Id. at 169. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 170. 
48. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
49. Id. at 302. 
50. Id. at 303. 
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that to be deemed violative of the Commerce Clause the taxpayer must show 
that the tax applies to activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing state, is 
not fairly apportioned, discriminates against interstate commerce, or is not 
fairly related to services provided by the state.
51
 
Twenty-two states currently have combined reporting systems in place, 
six of which have been enacted within the past five years.
52
  As a recent report 
by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities states, ―[a] major reason for 
states‘ growing interest [in combined reporting] is their recognition of how 
badly corporate tax shelters that exploit the lack of combined reporting are 
eroding state corporate tax payments.‖53  The report extols the virtues of using 
combined reporting to eliminate certain state corporate tax shelters, like the 
real estate investment trust (REIT) strategy used by Wal-Mart and the passive 
investment company (PIC) loophole used by Wisconsin banks.
54
 
B. Tax Avoidance Strategies in Wisconsin 
Among the many tax shelters used by corporations today, three of the 
most common involve the creation of subsidiaries that are exempt from 
corporate income tax in the state of formation.
55
  These three types are PICs, 
REITs, and captive insurance companies.
56
  Corporations use these shelters 
either to shift taxable profits to the subsidiary or to stash income-earning 
assets.
57
  Combined reporting could nullify all three tax shelters, as well as 
others.
58
  However, while combined reporting would effectively eliminate 
many tax shelters at use today, it would not stop the lawyers and accountants 
working with these corporations from coming up with new inventive ways to 
avoid taxes.  Fortunately, combined reporting would make it more difficult to 
develop tax avoidance schemes and would leave fewer loopholes to be 
exploited. 
In the past decade, Wisconsin has attempted to put an end to two tax 
shelters—REITs and PICs.  The most recent of the two attacks—Wal-Mart‘s 
 
51. Id. at 310–11.  These four criteria of state tax Commerce Clause scrutiny were first 
developed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), and together they are 
known as the Complete Auto four-prong test.  See Christopher R. Grissom et al., Challenges to 
Addback Statutes: Will the Statutes Survive?, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 757, 775 (2007). 
52. See MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 1; NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1. 
53. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 1. 
54. Id. at 2; see discussion infra Part II.B. 
55. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 2. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 2–3. 
58. Id. at 3–5.  Combined reporting would also nullify the transfer pricing and nexus isolation 
loopholes.  See infra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
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use of the REIT—will be discussed first, followed by the PIC strategy used by 
Wisconsin banks. 
1. Wal-Mart and the REIT 
Wal-Mart uses REITs
59
 as a way to avoid paying the full amount of 
corporate income taxes it would otherwise be required to pay.  Since 1996, 
Wal-Mart has structured its operations in twenty-seven states as follows: one 
subsidiary, Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, a REIT, is set up to manage 
the land that the stores sit on, and one subsidiary, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is set 
up to manage the stores themselves.
60
  The store management subsidiary pays 
rent to the REIT subsidiary for the land the stores sit on and deducts the 
amount of the rent from its taxable income as a business expense.
61
  Setting 
high rent payments leaves Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with ―little to no profit on 
which state taxes ha[ve] to be paid.‖62  This technique works because 
Wisconsin‘s tax laws call for separate reporting—all companies file separate 
returns, even if a single parent owns multiple subsidiaries.  Under combined 
reporting, both subsidiaries would be included on the return filed by their 
parent company; shifting money among subsidiaries would no longer be an 
option. 
In response, two separate parts of Wisconsin‘s government took action.63  
First, the state legislature got involved.  Effective for tax years beginning 
January 1, 2008, Wisconsin now requires that certain amounts deducted or 
excluded from gross income for federal tax purposes—specifically, interest 
and rent expenses that are paid, accrued, or incurred to one or more related 
entities—must be ―added back‖ before determining net income for Wisconsin 
tax purposes.
64
 
 
59. Real estate investment trusts will be discussed in more detail infra. 
60. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 13–14. 
61. Walters & Lank, supra note 2. 
62. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 14. 
63. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2.  While the Department of Revenue‘s case against Wal-
Mart has brought these issues to the surface yet again, Wal-Mart is not the only company the state is 
concerned about.  ―[T]hree of the largest corporations in the U.S.—Microsoft, Merck & Co. and 
Sears Holdings, owner of Kmart and Lands‘ End—paid no corporate income taxes in Wisconsin in 
2005.‖  Mike Ivey, Pols Go After Tax Dodgers; Bill Aims to Plug Corporate Loopholes, CAPITAL 
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Dec. 19, 2007, at A1. 
64. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2) (2007–2008); Edward Sakurai, Continued Trend Toward State 
Related-Party Expense Addback, 39 TAX ADVISER 807, 807 (2008).  The ―addback statute,‖ as it is 
commonly referred to, will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.B.  Additionally, Senator Dave 
Hansen (D-Green Bay) introduced the Corporate Tax Accountability Act to the Wisconsin 
Legislature in December 2007.  S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); see also discussion infra 
Part III.B. 
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Second, the Department of Revenue brought a case against Wal-Mart, Inc. 
before the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission to recover $17.7 million in 
back corporate taxes, interest, and penalties from 1998 to 2000.
65
  Department 
lawyer Mark Zimmer believes that Wal-Mart is not paying its fair share for 
the Wisconsin resources it utilizes in operating its stores.
66
  Instead, Wal-Mart 
shifts the burden ―to individuals and small businesses who are unable to set up 
such elaborate mechanisms.‖67 
Since REITs are complicated structures, some explanation of their 
formation and tax attributes may be helpful.  A REIT is a pass-through entity 
used for holding real estate.
68
  Created by Section 856 of Title 26 of the 
United States Code, a REIT may qualify for special tax treatment under the 
Internal Revenue Code as a common law business trust, a corporation, or any 
other association that is taxable as a corporation.
69
  Regardless of the chosen 
business entity, REITs are taxed as domestic corporations under Subchapter C 
of the Internal Revenue Code.
70
 
There are four major types of REITs being used in America today: equity 
trusts, mortgage trusts, hybrid trusts, and finite life trusts.
71
  Equity trusts are 
typically organized as ―blind pools‖ for investing in several unidentified rental 
properties held for an indefinite period of time for the purpose of producing 
income from rents that are then distributable to shareholders as dividends.
72
  
The Wal-Mart version of the REIT is slightly different.  Instead of investing 
 
65. See Walters & Lank, supra note 2. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See WILLIAM A. KELLEY, JR., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK 22 (2d ed. 
1998).  A pass-through entity is a non-taxable entity, such as a partnership, limited liability company, 
or Subchapter-S Corporation, where the entity computes its taxable income and then passes that 
income on to its owners as distributive shares.  See HOWARD E. ABRAMS, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER PASS-THRU ENTITIES 9 (1993).  The owners of the entity 
are responsible for the taxes due on the entity‘s earnings, i.e., the tax burden is ―passed-through‖ to 
the owners.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) (―A partnership as such shall not be subject to the 
income tax imposed by this chapter.  Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for 
income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.‖). 
69. 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2006); see KELLEY, supra note 68, at 22. 
70. 26 U.S.C. §§ 301–385 (2006). 
71. KELLEY, supra note 68, at 8–11. 
72. Id.  For comparison purposes, the mortgage trust is similar to the equity trust but, instead of 
holding real estate, the trust is organized for ―investing the proceeds from the sale of their shares in 
mortgages secured by real property, or mortgage-backed pass-through certificates.‖  Id. at 9.  Hybrid 
trusts are organized for investing in a combination of equity properties and mortgages.  Id. at 10.  
Finite life trusts became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to a weak market for 
REIT shares.  Id. at 11.  Investors were interested in seeing a return on their investment during their 
lifetime.  The difference between an equity trust and a finite life trust is the duration of the 
investment.  Finite life trusts are organized to acquire property for a pre-determined amount of 
time—typically four to fifteen years—after which the properties are liquidated and the proceeds 
distributed to the shareholders.  Id. 
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in unidentified rental properties, Wal-Mart‘s REITs are organized for the 
acquisition of specific properties—the property on which the Wal-Mart store 
sits.
73
 
To qualify as a REIT, and therefore qualify for a tax deduction for 
dividends paid to shareholders,
74
 an organization must meet Internal Revenue 
Code qualifications relating to status, income, and investment.
75
  Among the 
many requirements for forming and operating a REIT, two elements of 
specific relevance are the requirements that the REIT must have at least 100 
investors and that it must pay out at least ninety percent of its annual earnings 
to investors as dividends.
76
  In the federal tax system, those dividends are 
taxable due to an act of Congress that ―made dividend payments from REITs 
to other corporations ineligible for the ‗dividends-received deduction,‘ which 
effectively exempts most dividends paid from one corporation to another from 
the federal corporate income tax.‖77  The REIT loophole utilized by Wal-Mart 
in Wisconsin and elsewhere was created when states failed to follow in 
Congress‘s footsteps.78  The result: income earned by REITs is completely 
untaxed in many states.
79
 
Wisconsin is not the only state that has been affected by Wal-Mart‘s tax 
avoidance strategies.  According to Standard & Poor‘s Compustat, Wal-Mart 
has paid, on average, only half of the statutory state tax rates during the past 
decade, and the REIT strategy alone cut its state taxes by around twenty 
percent over one four-year period.
80
  In response, several states have tried or 
are trying to put an end to the REIT loophole‘s use.81 
In a well-publicized battle between Wal-Mart and the state of North 
Carolina,
82
 the state is attempting to put an end to Wal-Mart‘s REIT structure, 
calling the strategy an attempt to ―‗distort [the company‘s] true net 
 
73. See Drucker, supra note 5. 
74. KELLEY, supra note 68, at 11. 
75. 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2006). 
76. 26 U.S.C. § 856(a); MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 11. 
77. 26 U.S.C. § 243(d)(3) (2006); MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 12. 
78. See MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 12.  Wisconsin has effectively closed this loophole with 
the addback statute that will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.B. 
79. Id. at 12. 
80. See Drucker, supra note 5 (alteration in original). 
81. Jack Wood, Wal-Mart’s Tax Shelter Room, NEWSTEX WEB BLOGS, Oct. 23, 2007.  Since 
the Drucker article appeared in the Wall Street Journal in February, six states—including Illinois, 
Maryland, New York, and Rhode Island—―have passed laws attempting to prohibit the maneuver.‖  
Id. 
82. David Ranii, Wal-Mart Suit Plows Ahead, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 1, 
2007, at D3.  The case was thrust into the national spotlight in February 2007 by Drucker‘s Wall 
Street Journal article, supra note 5. 
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income.‘‖83  In 2005, North Carolina ordered Wal-Mart to pay $33 million in 
back taxes.
84
  The company paid the bill but turned around and sued the state 
for a $30.2 million tax refund, accusing the state of ―improperly assessing its 
corporate income tax bill.‖85  Following an audit, the North Carolina 
Department of Revenue determined that the company‘s tax return did not 
―disclose [its] true earnings‖ and forced it to file a single consolidated 
return.
86
  The state then calculated an overall tax bill based on all of Wal-
Mart‘s North Carolina stores, including its Sam‘s Club locations as well as its 
REITs.
87
  Wal-Mart claims that this method of tax calculation violates the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution by determining 
taxable income ―in an arbitrary manner, without the guidance of any 
constitutionally acceptable standard.‖88  Consistent with prior Supreme Court 
holdings, the Wake County judge did not agree and rejected Wal-Mart‘s 
claim.
89
  Wal-Mart has appealed the ruling.
90
 
Unfortunately, Wal-Mart is not the only company using the REIT 
loophole to its advantage.  According to the Wall Street Journal, ―[s]tate 
authorities have had mixed records so far in pursuing back taxes and penalties 
in [REIT] cases.‖91  AutoZone has been pursued by two separate states 
regarding its use of the REIT structure, winning the right to continue 
deducting the dividends in Kentucky but losing the preliminary round in its 
battle with Louisiana.
92
  Also, Massachusetts battled two recent acquisitions 
of Bank of America—Fleet Funding and Bank Boston Corp.—over their 
REIT structure, and Hawaii and Alabama have also engaged in litigation 
regarding REITs used within their states.
93
  However, it is unknown how 
many battles states have fought over the use of REITs to lessen a company‘s 
corporate tax burden ―because such tax disputes are generally not disclosed 
 
83. Drucker, supra note 5 (quoting filings from the case). 
84. Id. 
85. Ranii, supra note 82. 
86. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. See id. 
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89. David Ranii, Judge Denies Giant Tax Refund, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 5, 
2008, at D1.  In response to the ruling, Department of Revenue spokeswoman Kim Brooks stated that 
it is not ―‗just a victory for the Department of Revenue, it is really a victory for every North Carolina 
taxpayer.‘‖  Id. 
90. Staff Reports, Wal-Mart to Appeal Tax Refund Ruling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Feb. 5, 2008, at D2. 
91. Drucker, supra note 5. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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unless lawsuits are publicly filed or the company reveals them in [Security 
Exchange Commission] filings.‖94 
2. Wisconsin Banks and the PIC 
Since early in this decade, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue has 
been engaged in an ongoing battle with state banks using another type of tax 
shelter—the PIC.95  Wisconsin banks set up subsidiaries to hold their 
investment assets in states that have no corporate income tax, such as Nevada 
or Delaware.
96
  In doing so, the banks transfer investment income that would 
otherwise be taxable in Wisconsin to places where it is not, thereby avoiding 
paying taxes on the assets.
97
  This loophole exists in many non-combined 
reporting states and results in many corporations getting away with paying 
little or no corporate tax in the state where they conduct their business.
98
  
Collections from Wisconsin banks declined by more than 55% from 1996 to 
2000—from $39.2 million to $17.3 million, a decline that was at least 
partially attributable to the increased use of this loophole.
99
 
In 2003, the Department of Revenue stepped in and tried to put an end to 
the loophole.
100
  The state has settled with at least 180 banks—slightly more 
than half of the banks doing business in Wisconsin—and has collected around 
$42 million in back-tax payments.
101
  However, some banks are still 
challenging Wisconsin‘s authority to tax their Nevada PICs.102  Opponents of 
Wisconsin‘s loophole-plugging strategy for combating the banks‘ tax-
avoidance strategy worry that ―a state defeat in a single court case could undo 
all those settlements, at least with respect to future tax years.‖103  Regardless 
of whether such a concern is justified, simply plugging loopholes is not 
guaranteed to put an end to the problem in the long run. 
Another version of the PIC strategy is the intangible holding company or 
trademark holding company loophole, where corporations transfer intangible 
assets that make money outside of the company to subsidiaries in non-
 
94. Id. 
95. See, e.g., Mike Ivey, State Banks Can Keep Subsidiaries, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), 
Sept. 16, 2004, at 1E. 
96. See id. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name?  Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That 
Which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. 1, 5 (2007). 
99. Mike Ivey, Even Small Banks Follow the Leaders; They Set Up Shell Subsidiaries in No-
Tax States, Series: Wisconsin Taxes Who Really Pays?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 14, 
2003, at 7A; see also MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 10. 
100. Ivey, supra note 95. 
101. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 10–11. 
102. Id. at 11. 
103. Id. 
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combined reporting states or states with no corporate income tax altogether.
104
  
A 2002 Wall Street Journal article highlighted the use of the loophole by 
corporations across the country whereby they transfer their trademarks to the 
subsidiary holding company and then pay ―huge fees for use of the brand 
names.‖105  Those royalty fees are then deducted from state income to reduce 
the company‘s tax liability.106 
Of the almost fifty corporations identified by the article, one of special 
significance to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue was Kohl‘s.107  The 
same year the article was published, the Department sought ―$800,000 in back 
taxes‖ from Kohl‘s for the tax years 1994 to 1996.108  The case was settled out 
of court in 2003 so it is uncertain how much Wisconsin was ultimately able to 
collect; Kohl‘s tax payments in subsequent years have also been kept secret, 
so it is unknown what effect the litigation had on Kohl‘s use of the holding 
company loophole.
109
 
Although the use of many of these specific loopholes by these specific 
companies has been shut down by the Department of Revenue‘s targeted 
litigation over the past decade, future use of these and similar tax avoidance 
strategies is likely.  The only proven way to eliminate their use is to adopt 
combined reporting.  Opponents of combined reporting worry that a state tax 
structure requiring corporations to pay more in state and local taxes each year 
will counteract the already daunting task of luring corporations to 
Wisconsin.
110
  However, requiring corporations to pay their fair share for 
valuable state-sponsored resources will actually help the business climate by 
increasing the revenues that pay for those resources. 
 
104. Id. at 9.  The most notable use of the intangible holding company strategy is Toys R Us‘s 
use of a holding company to hold and license the use of its trademarks and trade names.  See 
Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm‘n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 
(1993).  The Geoffrey court concluded that ―by licensing intangibles for use in [South Carolina] and 
deriving income from their use [in South Carolina], Geoffrey [had] a ‗substantial nexus‘ with South 
Carolina.‖  Id. at 18; see also Cory D. Olson, Follow the Giraffe’s Lead—Lanco, Inc. v. Director, 
Division of Taxation Gets Lost in the Quagmire that Is State Taxation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
789, 804–05 (2005). 
105. Glenn R. Simpson, Diminishing Returns: A Tax Maneuver In Delaware Puts Squeeze on 
States—Trademark-Holding Companies Help Limited, Many Others Save Millions of Dollars—One 
Address for 670 Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A1. 
106. Id. 
107. Id.  For a complete list of the companies discovered by the Wall Street Journal to be using 
this form of tax avoidance, see MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 7. 
108. Mike Ivey, State Takes Kohl’s Corp. to Court in Pivotal Tax Case, Series: Wisconsin 
Taxes Who Really Pays?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 14, 2003, at 7A. 
109. See INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 15. 
110. See, e.g., NACKER, supra note 26, 9–10; Jeff Schoepke, Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, Insight: 
A National View of Wisconsin‘s Business Tax Climate (2007), http://www.wmc.org/printdisplay.cfm 
?ID=1904; Sen. Dave Schultz, Our Public Policy Must Back Up Our Goals (Apr. 27, 2007), 
http://www.legis.wi.gov/senate/sen17/news/Press/2007/col2007-002.asp. 
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C. Wisconsin’s Business Climate 
Business climate is typically defined as a combination of factors relating 
to the investment potential of a certain location.
111
  These factors include: 
 
(1) the quality and availability of the social and physical 
infrastructure that are the building blocks of successful 
economies; (2) measures of how strong the economy is and 
how well it provides opportunities for employment, profits, 
and an improving quality of life; (3) tax and fiscal measures, 
which indicate the extent to which individuals and companies 
are taxed and how those funds are used to grow the economy; 
and (4) indicators of an area‘s reputation in the business 
community for being accommodating and responsive to the 
needs of business.
112
 
 
Among the many arguments against higher taxes, proponents of the 
contention that taxes are damaging to the business climate maintain that lower 
taxes are good for economic growth because of the image they create 
regarding the state‘s support of business interests.113  However, business 
decision makers are not likely to base such important decisions on a 
perception of what a certain state does or does not support.  They are more 
likely to evaluate the entire cost-of-doing-business picture in addition to the 
availability of valuable public services and a skilled workforce.
114
 
It is no secret that Wisconsin‘s business climate could use 
improvement.
115
  When the Tax Foundation released its 2009 State Business 
Tax Climate Index in October 2008, Wisconsin was ranked thirty-eight, up 
one spot from the 2008 rankings but still only two spots away from being in 
 
111. Robert G. Lynch, Weaknesses in the Common Arguments for State and Local Tax Cuts 
and Incentives, 32 ST. TAX NOTES 597, 601 (2004). 
112. Id. 
113. See Pomp, supra note 11, at 59–60.  Pomp notes that opponents of combined reporting 
often ―cloak themselves with the banner of economic development‖ by arguing that combined 
reporting will hurt Wisconsin‘s business climate by ―chas[ing] businesses out of the state, 
discourag[ing] new ones from coming to Wisconsin, and reduc[ing] jobs.‖  Id. at 60. 
114. Id. at 61.  Pomp lists ten reasons why legislators should not listen to arguments that link 
changes in the tax system that are opposed by business to poor economic development.  Id. at 61–66.  
Specifically, Pomp notes that ―innumerable factors are important to a business in its decision about 
where to locate,‖ including ―quality and cost of labor, proximity to markets, . . . the level and quality 
of public services, and the range of other amenities that enter into the general quality of life offered.‖  
Id. at 61–63. 
115. See, e.g., JOSHUA BARRO, TAX FOUND., BACKGROUND PAPER: 2009 STATE BUSINESS 
TAX CLIMATE INDEX 3 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp58.pdf; David 
Brunori, Does the State Tax Climate Really Matter?, 39 ST. TAX NOTES 887, 887 (2006). 
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the bottom ten.
116
  Wisconsin also moved from thirty-two to twenty-nine on 
the Corporate Tax Index between 2007 and 2009.
117
  Nothing to be proud of, 
but a low ranking on such a list does not guarantee that businesses will not 
want to locate within Wisconsin‘s borders.118 
Tax is not the only consideration businesses make when deciding where to 
locate.
119
  ―[S]tate spending on infrastructure and education‖ may also have a 
―positive effect on business activity.‖120  Furthermore, there are at least a 
dozen different business climate indexes that all utilize different criteria and 
evaluation methods in their analysis, and Wisconsin‘s ranking on each index 
varies.
121
  For example, Wisconsin has been ranked as high as sixteenth on the 
Beacon Hill Institute‘s 2005 Metro Area and State Competitiveness Report,122 
but on Site Selection magazine‘s recent ranking of United States business 
climates, Wisconsin was not listed among the states placing in the top twenty-
five.
123
 
 
116. BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1. 
117. Id. at 12 tbl.3.  The five major components that make up the Tax Foundation‘s State 
Business Tax Climate Index, with Wisconsin‘s 2008 ranking in parentheses, are corporate tax (29th), 
individual income tax (44th), sales tax (18th), unemployment insurance tax (25th), and property tax 
(31st).  Id. at 9 tbl.2. 
118. For example, Forbes magazine recently ranked Milwaukee as one of the top ten up-and-
coming cities for technology companies.  William Pentland, Top 10 Up-And-Coming Tech Cities, 
FORBES, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/10/columbus-milwaukee-houston-ent-tech-
cx_wp_0310smallbizoutlooktechcity.html.  In addition, Forbes recently ranked Madison, Wisconsin, 
as the number one city for job growth in 2009.  Tara Weiss, Ten Cities for Job Growth in 2009, 
FORBES, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2009/01/05/cities-jobs-employment-
leadership-careers-cx_tw_0105cities.html. 
119. Brunori, supra note 115, at 887–88. 
120. Id. at 888. 
121. See generally GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER ET AL., KANSAS, INC. BUSINESS CLIMATE 
INDEXES: WHICH WORK, WHICH DON‘T, AND WHAT CAN THEY SAY ABOUT THE KANSAS 
ECONOMY? 5, 19–21 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.kansasinc.org/pubs/working/Business% 
20Climate%20Indexes.pdf (providing information regarding each index). 
122. BEACON HILL INST., METRO AREA AND STATE COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005, at 68, 
available at http://www.beaconhill.org/Compete05/FinalCompete05-060921.pdf.  Additionally, 
Milwaukee was ranked twenty-fifth out of fifty metropolitan areas.  Id. at 96.  The Beacon Hill study 
measures competitiveness by studying eight indicators of the quality of the business environment: 
government and fiscal policies; security; infrastructure; human resources; technology; business 
incubation; openness; and environmental policy.  Id. at 9–10. 
123. Mark Arend & Adam Bruns, Force Field, SITE SELECTION, Nov. 2007, at 879.  The Site 
Selection ranking is developed based on surveys of corporate real estate decision makers and actual 
project activity.  Id.  According to Site Selection’s survey of corporate real estate executives, the state 
and local tax scheme of a location ranked as the third most important factor involved in location 
decisions.  Id. at 915.  The availability of incentives and flexibility of incentives programs came in at 
fifth and eighth, respectively.  Id.  The top two spots went to the availability of desired workforce 
skills and the ease of permitting and regulatory procedures.  Id.  Based on this survey, it seems that, 
while tax is a very important consideration, it is not the most important. 
844 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:829 
Furthermore, it has been argued that ―state and local taxes are not 
typically a significant cost of doing business.‖124  According to a 2004 State 
Tax Notes article by Robert G. Lynch, state and local taxes are only a small 
piece of the business costs pie, and they ―reduce profits only to a limited 
extent.‖125  Increasingly, corporations are looking to quality of life factors for 
choosing where to locate, including schools, safety, transportation, and other 
cultural aspects that will help draw top-quality employees.
126
  ―Businesses 
need to know that they can rely on high-quality, well-administered public 
services to facilitate the conduct of their enterprises.‖127 
Instead of focusing on the potential hit Wisconsin‘s business climate 
might take if corporations are required to account for all income attributable 
to Wisconsin, perhaps a better focus is on what nontax-related steps 
Wisconsin can take to better its business climate.  According to the recent 
report by the Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future, many of the public services that 
businesses value when making location decisions are facing budget 
shortfalls.
128
  The main reason for the reduction and/or elimination of many of 
these vital services is the absence of adequate state aid.
129
 
Corporate tax revenue is an important and significant contributor to the 
funding of valuable state and local programs.  Ernst & Young‘s annual review 
of state and local business taxes estimates that Wisconsin businesses paid 
35% of all state taxes collected and 47% of all local taxes.
130
  However, the 
United States‘ averages are 40% and 52%, respectively.131  If Wisconsin 
corporations paid at the same level as the national average, they would pay an 
additional $800 million each year.
132
  ―As a taxpaying partner in supporting 
state and local services, Wisconsin‘s corporate sector ranks [forty-first] 
among all the states, according to Ernst & Young.‖133  Instead of corporations 
paying this amount, the burden of paying for valuable public services is 
passed on to individuals in the form of property and sales taxes.  Adopting a 
system that requires corporations to pay their fair share, like combined 
 
124. Lynch, supra note 111, at 597. 
125. Id. 
126. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 1. 
127. Lynch, supra note 111, at 601. 
128. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 3.  Among the public systems the report lists as 
being in crisis are public schools (forced to cut staff and eliminate services offered to students), 
universities and technical colleges (raising tuition and cutting financial aid), fire safety and 
emergency medical services (personnel levels reduced), and programs designed to help people with 
disabilities (programs reduced or eliminated).  Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 8–9. 
131. Id. at 9. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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reporting, would force corporations to help support the public services that 
they value. 
III. THREE STRATEGIES FOR ATTACKING TAX AVOIDANCE LOOPHOLES 
Wisconsin needs to make changes to its current tax strategy in order to 
reduce the diminishing amount of taxes collected from corporations doing 
business within its borders, as well as increase the revenues needed to reinvest 
in valuable public services that will increase economic growth and 
development and, hopefully, lead to an improved business climate.  To 
achieve these goals, Wisconsin has a few options.  First, it can continue its 
strategy of attacking tax avoidance strategies and loopholes as they become 
apparent.  Second, it can adopt legislation aimed at stopping certain tax 
avoidance strategies.  Third, it can adopt combined reporting. 
A. Attack Loopholes as They Become Apparent 
An alternative to adopting combined reporting, and a strategy used by 
Wisconsin, is to attack each tax avoidance strategy individually.  Attacking 
tax avoidance strategies and loopholes as they become apparent can be an 
effective strategy, but only for stopping specific tax avoidance strategies.  It 
does nothing to stop the other similar shelters that would be stopped with 
combined reporting.  Additionally, attacking each shelter individually is a 
costly and time-consuming endeavor.
134
 
Further, a court decision or legislation blocking a certain loophole may be 
vulnerable to legal challenges in the future and may undo all the work that 
closed the loophole in the first place.
135
  A properly drafted combined 
reporting system would not be so vulnerable, as the system‘s use has twice 
been upheld by the Supreme Court.
136
  The best example of this strategy‘s 
apparent success—but more accurately described as its potential failure—is 
the PIC loophole plugged in 2003 and discussed earlier.
137
  Similarly, even if 
the Department of Revenue wins a Tax Appeals Commission case against a 
company like Wal-Mart, there is no guarantee that it will be able to collect the 
taxes, and nothing will stop the company‘s creative accounting and legal 
professionals from inventing new, more elusive tax avoidance strategies.
138
  
 
134. Consider, for example, that each shelter attack has to go through the judicial process, 
complete with all the monetary and opportunity costs of litigation. 
135. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Wisconsin‘s PIC litigation.  
136. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994); Container Corp. 
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983). 
137. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
138. And rightfully so.  As Judge Learned Hand stated, ―Any one may so arrange his affairs 
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay 
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one‘s taxes.‖  Helvering v. Gregory, 69 
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Wisconsin needs a more permanent plan that will bring in more revenue and 
stop these tax avoidance strategies across the board. 
Additionally, this strategy does nothing to improve the business climate.  
It is the strategy that has been used in Wisconsin for many years, and—as 
various rankings and studies have shown—the Wisconsin business climate is 
lackluster at best.
139
  Improving the business climate requires investing in 
public services and training a skilled workforce.
140
  Spending valuable state 
resources attacking tax avoidance strategies through litigation does neither of 
these and is counterproductive to the goal of improving the business climate. 
B. Adopt Targeted Legislation 
Wisconsin policy makers have been working on ways to fix the state‘s 
corporate tax structure in a way that will reduce or eliminate the lost revenues 
from tax avoidance strategies employed by companies like Wal-Mart.  Most 
significantly, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted a related-entity addback 
provision,
141
 which requires certain entities to add back interest and rental 
expenses paid to related entities that were deducted from taxable income at 
the federal level before determining taxable income at the state level.
142
  More 
importantly, the addback provision effectively closes the Wal-Mart REIT 
loophole. 
Addback statutes similar to the one enacted in Wisconsin began to appear 
widely around the new millennium.
143
  Although each state‘s statute differs 
slightly, the general purpose of each is the same: to cure the PIC and REIT 
loopholes by requiring companies to account for related-party transactions.
144
  
Most addback statutes require the addback of interest or royalty expenses 
 
F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).  As long as the loopholes exist, tax professionals should not be faulted 
for using them.  However, combined reporting would close these loopholes. 
139. See supra Part II.C. 
140. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 111, at 601. 
141. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2) (2007–2008), enacted by 2007 Wis. Act 226 § 70. 
142. Memorandum from the Legislative Fiscal Bureau to the Members of the Comm. of 
Conference 19–22 (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2007-
09Bills/2008_05_12_cc.pdf.  The provision applies to corporations, S-Corporations, partnerships, 
LLCs, individuals, fiduciaries, and insurance companies.  Wis. Dep‘t of Rev., Addback of Related 
Party Interest and Rent Expenses (June 19, 2008), http://www.revenue.wi.gov/taxpro/news/ 
080619.pdf. 
143. Michigan was the first state to enact an addback statute in 1975.  Christopher R. Grissom 
& Janette M. Lohman, Challenges to Addback Statutes: Will the Statutes Survive? , 46 ST. TAX 
NOTES 757, 760 (2007).  Since then at least sixteen states, as well as the District of Columbia have 
done so, including Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and 
Virginia.  Id. 
144. Id. 
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unless the transaction meets one or more exceptions.
 145
  Some of the common 
exceptions include:
146
 situations where the taxpayer has entered a written 
agreement with the department responsible for tax collection to use an 
alternative apportionment method;
147
 the adjustments are unreasonable;
148
 and 
various versions of an exception if the taxpayer can prove that the payment 
was not made with the purpose of tax avoidance.
149
 
Wisconsin‘s addback provision has the same goals.  As Governor Doyle 
put it, the addback statute ―[c]loses an unacceptable tax loophole used by 
multinational corporations to shift profits out of the state to avoid paying 
Wisconsin taxes.‖150  Specifically the provision states that ―the amount 
deducted or excluded under the Internal Revenue Code for interest expenses 
and rental expenses that are directly or indirectly paid, accrued, or incurred to, 
or in connection directly or indirectly with one or more direct or indirect 
transactions with, one or more related entities.‖151  Addback is not required 
under the following exceptions: 
 
The amount is disclosed and: 
 
1.  The related party to which the taxpayer paid, accrued, 
or incurred the interest or rental expenses paid, accrued, or 
incurred such amounts to an unrelated party; 
 
2.  The related party was subject to tax on, or measured by, 
its net income in Wisconsin or any other state, U.S. 
possession, or foreign country, and the aggregate effective 
 
145. Id. 
146. See id. at 760–71 for a summation of the addback statutes in nineteen states and the 
District of Columbia. 
147. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
148. See, e.g., id. 
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-35(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (requiring that the 
related-party is not primarily engaged in managing, acquiring, or maintaining intangible property or 
related-party financing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-423(g)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2008) (requiring that 
the related-party payment was an arms-length transaction); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
218c(c)(2)(A) (West 2008) (requiring that the related-party ―during the same income year directly or 
indirectly paid, accrued or incurred such portion to a person who is not a related member‖). 
150. Gov. Jim Doyle, Governor’s Veto Message, WIS. ASSEMBLY J. 792, 793 (2008).  The 
Governor also noted that he concurred with the Legislature‘s intent that the addback provision would 
not lead to corporations being taxed twice, and he requested that the Department of Revenue ensure 
that such intent be carried through in interpreting and enforcing the provision.  See id. at 794. 
151. WIS. STAT. § 71.26(2)(a)(7) (2007–2008).  ―Related entity‖ is defined by section 
71.01(9am) of the Wisconsin Statutes as ―any person related to a taxpayer as provided under section 
267 or 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code . . . and any real estate investment trust under section 856 
of the Internal Revenue Code, except a qualified real estate investment trust.‖  Id. § 71.01(9am) 
(2007–2008). 
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tax rate applied to the income is at least 80% of the 
taxpayer‘s aggregate effective rate; or 
 
3.  The taxpayer establishes that the transaction has a 
business purpose other than the avoidance or reduction of 
tax, the transaction changed the taxpayer‘s economic 
position in a meaningful way apart from the tax effects, 
and the interest and/or rental expenses were paid at an 
arm‘s-length rate.152 
 
However, the provision only requires the addback of interest and rental 
payments—it does not require the addback of royalty payments.153  
Consequently, it does nothing to stop corporations from utilizing the 
intangible holding company loophole to avoid taxes on royalty income from 
intellectual property.
154
 
Additionally, there is some concern regarding whether the addback 
statutes will stand up against constitutional challenges.  Specifically, it has 
been argued that corporate taxpayers may be able to defeat addback statutes 
because the addback requirement is actually a tax on the out-of-state related 
entity; the out-of-state related entity does not have taxable presence in the 
taxing state, and, therefore, the provision violates the Commerce and Due 
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution because it attempts to tax 
extraterritorial values.
155
 
As widespread use of addback provisions is a relatively recent trend, there 
have been only a few judicial challenges as of yet, and it is still unclear in 
whose favor the balance will weigh.  In the first of such decisions, VFJ 
Ventures, Inc. v. Surtees, Inc.,
156
 an Alabama circuit court found that VFJ 
Ventures did not have to add back royalty payments to two related-party 
intangible management companies because, under an Alabama statutory 
 
152. Id. § 71.80(23) (2007–2008); see also Sakurai, supra note 64, at 807 (summarizing 
common exceptions to addback statutes). 
153. Jamshed Patel, Corporate Income Tax: Intangible Holding Companies, LEXISNEXIS 
PRACTICE INSIGHTS (2008), available at Lexis WI Tax P.I. 4,160. 
154. Id. 
155. Philip M. Plant, The Addback Statute Wars—The Taxpayers’ Case, 37 STATE TAX NOTES 
585, 585–86 (2005); see also Grissom & Lohman, supra note 143 (highlighting the potential issues 
that may arise under the four prongs of the Complete Auto Commerce Clause analysis as well as the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause).  But see Sheldon H. Laskin, Contention on 
State Income Tax Addback Statutes is Based on a Misconception, 27 ST. TAX NOTES 701 (2005) 
(responding to Plant‘s article and asserting that payments triggering addback statutes are sufficiently 
related to business income in the taxing state). 
156. Montgomery County Circuit Court, No. CV-03-3172 (Ala. Jan. 24, 2007) (text of decision 
available in 2007 State Tax Notes 20-6). 
2009] THE COMBINED REPORTING DEBATE 849 
exception, requiring VFJ Ventures to do so would be unreasonable.
157
  In his 
decision, Judge McCooey stated that the payments were a necessary cost of 
doing business, and therefore, requiring VFJ Ventures to add back the 
payments would frustrate the purpose of the addback statute, which is to 
―prevent abusive deductions and to ensure that income fairly attributable to 
Alabama is taxed in Alabama.‖158 
However, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals overturned Judge 
McCooey‘s decision, holding that the unreasonable exception applied only 
when the addback results in ―taxation that is out of proportion to [the 
corporation‘s] activities in [Alabama].‖159  The court agreed with the Alabama 
Department of Revenue‘s interpretation of the unreasonableness exception as 
―not being determined by business purpose or economic substance.‖160  
Consequently, VFJ Ventures was required to add back the royalty payments 
made to the related entities.
161
 
Regardless of the results of such litigation in Wisconsin or other states, it 
seems that Wisconsin‘s addback statute may not provide a sufficient response 
to the problems of corporate tax avoidance.
162
  In another legislative effort to 
solve the problem, Senator Dave Hansen (D-Green Bay) introduced the 
Corporate Tax Accountability Act in December 2007.
163
  The Act was 
introduced in response to a report by the Milwaukee-based Institute for 
Wisconsin‘s Future regarding corporate tax avoidance.164  According to the 
 
157. Id. at 5. 
158. Id. 
159. Surtees v. VFJ Ventures, Inc., No. CV-03-3172, 2008 WL 344118, at *26 (Ala. Civ. App. 
Feb. 8, 2008), aff’d sub. nom; Ex parte VFJ Ventures, Inc., No. CV-03-3172, 2008 WL 4277998, at 
*1 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2008). 
160. VFJ Ventures, Inc., 2008 WL 344118, at *13. 
161. See id. at *28. 
162. It has been argued that addback statutes are the ―second best solution‖ to addressing the 
problems of holding company tax avoidance.  Mark J. Cowan & Clint Kakstys, A Green Mountain 
Miracle and the Garden State Grab: Lessons From Vermont and New Jersey on State Corporate Tax 
Reform, 60 TAX LAW. 351, 362 (2007), available at 
http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/071219hansen.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Specifically, Cowan and Kakstys argue that there are four problems with addback statutes: (1) they 
are ―fairly easy to plan around‖; (2) the exceptions ―create litigation‖; (3) they ―do not address the 
shifting of income that occurs from the movement of assets to no-tax states‖; and (4) ―there may be 
constitutional issues.‖  Id. at 362–63. 
163. S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); Press Release, Wis. Sen. Dave Hansen, 
Senator Hansen Introduces Corporate Tax Accountability Act (Dec. 20, 2007); Ivey, supra note 63.  
The proposed Act, however, was still in the possession of the Senate at the end of the general 
business floor period that adjourned on March 13, 2008.  Chief Clerk’s Entries, WIS. SENATE J., Mar. 
21, 2008, at 735.  Accordingly, it failed to pass pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1 and was 
adversely disposed of on March 21, 2008.  Id. 
164. INST. FOR WIS.‘S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 1. 
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report, uncollected corporate taxes cost Wisconsin $643 million in 2006.
165
  
The Act was aimed at stopping what the report referred to as ―corporate tax 
leakage‖166 by requiring corporations to disclose the following: 
 
 Their bottom-line tax liability in the state, including 
any tax credits or exemptions that affect their income 
for tax reasons. 
 Any subsidiaries and their existing relationships that 
may affect taxable income in Wisconsin. 
 Information that would help identify other legal ways 
in which corporations reduce or avoid paying their 
fair share of state taxes.
167
 
 
While the addback statute and the proposed Corporate Tax Accountability 
Act are both a step in the right direction for Wisconsin, they may not answer 
the problems of increasing revenue collection and avoiding corporate use of 
tax avoidance strategies.  The best method for accomplishing both goals is the 
adoption of a state tax strategy that utilizes combined reporting. 
C. Adopt Combined Reporting 
Combined reporting, as a state tax strategy, simply requires corporations 
to pay their fair share of state corporate income tax.  In addition to eliminating 
the REIT loophole used by Wal-Mart, it would also eliminate any tax 
avoidance scheme that ―shift[s] taxable profits into a tax-haven subsidiary‖ or 
―stash[es] corporate assets that earn income from outside the corporation.‖168  
Additionally, combined reporting would be effective against other forms of 
tax avoidance, such as the strategies known as transfer pricing
169
 and nexus 
 
165. Id. at 6. 
166. Id. at 1.  The Institute for Wisconsin‘s Future defines ―corporate tax leakage‖ as ―the loss 
of state corporate income tax due to large companies‘ tax avoidance using tax breaks, loopholes and 
profit shelters.‖  Id. 
167.  Corporate Tax Accountability Act, S.B. 367, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007); Press 
Release, Wis. Sen. Dave Hansen, supra note 163. 
168. MAZEROV, supra note 26, at 2–3. 
169. Transfer pricing occurs when a manufacturer corporation creates a subsidiary to control its 
distribution and sales activities within a state where its customers are located.  Id. at 19.  The price 
paid for the products by the distribution subsidiary to the manufacturing plant is known as the 
―transfer price.‖  Id.  If both the plant and its distribution subsidiary are located in non-combined 
reporting states, the corporation may ―set its transfer prices in a way that minimizes its total tax 
liability.‖  Id.  To combat tax-motivated transfer pricing, almost every non-combined reporting state 
―allows its tax department to adjust transfer prices on a case-by-case basis to fairly reflect the income 
actually earned in the state.‖  Id. at 20.  However, it is not practical for state tax departments to audit 
the millions of transactions that occur every year.  Id.  Combined reporting would eliminate the need 
to do so, as well as eliminate tax-motivated transfer pricing altogether.  See id. at 20, 22. 
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isolation, where companies ―‗wall-off‘ as much of the corporation‘s profit as 
possible in a subsidiary that is not taxable in the state(s) where the 
subsidiary‘s customers are located.‖170 
The myriad of benefits resulting from combined reporting can all be 
encapsulated by its two main advantages.  First, combined reporting renders 
the tax planning techniques discussed in this Comment moot.
171
  Not only 
does this eliminate tax avoidance, but also it allows corporations to structure 
themselves in a way that is most advantageous to their operations instead of 
adopting a structure that is most advantageous to tax planning.
172
  Second, 
combined reporting guarantees accuracy and equality in tax collections.
173
  By 
allowing the state to tax the value of the enterprise as a whole, including the 
value derived from synergies and ―interdependencies that exist between 
related corporations,‖ combined reporting captures a more accurate level of 
the corporation‘s earnings within the state.174  Additionally, combined 
reporting lessens the burden on smaller intrastate entities that may not be 
fiscally able to take advantage of tax-avoidance strategies by ensuring that 
such companies do not ―shoulder[] a disproportionate share of the tax 
burden.‖175 
Two main arguments have been advanced in opposition to combined 
reporting.  First, it has been argued that combined reporting as a system is too 
complex, and it will create expensive and needless litigation.
176
  However, 
while combined reporting is a complex system and it may create a learning 
curve for some corporations, it is already being used in twenty-two states.
177
  
Many of the large interstate corporations that will be most affected by 
combined reporting, such as Wal-Mart, are already doing business in 
combined reporting states and will already be accustomed to its general 
principles and procedures.  Specifically, Illinois and Minnesota have both 
been using combined reporting for over twenty years.
178
 
 
170. Id. at 3.  Nexus isolation takes advantage of a federal law that limits the amount of income 
taxable to out-of-state corporations if the companies ―limit their activities within the state to 
‗solicitation of orders.‘‖  Id.  Combined reporting eliminates much of the benefit of nexus isolation 
by requiring any subsidiary the state has nexus over to calculate its tax based on the profits of the 
subsidiary‘s entire corporate family.  Id. at 4. 
171. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 366. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 367. 
175. Id. at 366. 
176. Id. at 368. 
177. See NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1. 
178. Id. 
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Additionally, litigation regarding tax-avoidance techniques is already 
occurring, such as Wisconsin‘s battles with Wal-Mart and bank PICs.179  
Combined reporting will eliminate the necessity for litigation aimed at 
attacking tax loopholes.  Although there is likely to be some litigation while 
corporations struggle with the State over what income must be included and 
which entities are part of the unitary business, the expense of such litigation 
may be offset by the reduction of other tax-avoidance litigation.  
Consequently, this argument is a wash. 
The second argument against combined reporting is its potential effect on 
the business climate.
180
  Opponents of combined reporting argue that 
combined reporting will cause corporations ―to leave the state, discourage 
other businesses from entering the state, and result in the loss of jobs.‖181  
However, this does not appear to be the case.  Many of the states that have 
adopted combined reporting consistently rank higher on business climate 
rankings than Wisconsin.
182
  In fact, of the twenty-two states that currently 
have a combined reporting regime in place, fifteen were ranked higher than 
Wisconsin on the Tax Foundation‘s index.183  Also, of the twelve states 
ranked lower than Wisconsin, five do not have combined reporting.
184
  It 
seems that the corporate tax regime each state uses does not have a 
measurable impact on the state‘s business climate.  Additionally, if a 
corporation wants to avoid combined reporting it would have to limit its 
operations to thirty states, excluding California, Texas, Illinois, and New 
York—all states with a considerable business presence.185  It seems unlikely 
that a corporation will refuse to do business in a state simply because of the 
tax regime at work in that state.
186
 
Vermont is a good example of a state with what may be considered a poor 
business tax climate that recently adopted combined reporting.  Vermont 
perennially ranks in the low- to mid-forties on the Tax Foundation‘s State 
 
179. See supra Part II.B. 
180. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 368; Pomp, supra note 11, at 60. 
181. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 368. 
182. See BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1. 
183. Id.  Those states are: Alaska (4th), Montana (6th), Texas (7th), New Hampshire (8th), 
Oregon (9th), Utah (11th), Colorado (13th), Michigan (20th), Arizona (22nd), Illinois (23rd), Hawaii 
(24th), Idaho (29th), North Dakota (30th), Kansas (31st), and West Virginia (36th).  Id. 
184. Id.  Those states are North Carolina (39th), Iowa (44th), Maryland (45th), Rhode Island 
(46th), and New Jersey (50th).  Id. 
185. See NACKER, supra note 26, at 5 tbl.1. 
186. However, it must be noted that a state‘s corporate tax regime may have some effect on 
where companies choose to locate manufacturing and transportation operations, among other 
decisions.  Consequently, Wisconsin must work on improving the other aspects of its business 
climate—such as availability of a skilled workforce, standard of living, education, etc.—in order to 
offset any concern that such companies may have. 
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Business Tax Climate Index.
187
  In 2003, the year before Vermont adopted 
combined reporting, the state ranked forty-third.
188
  In 2009, five years after 
adopting combined reporting, Vermont again is ranked forty-third.
189
  While a 
low ranking is nothing to strive for, the fact that the state‘s business tax 
climate ranking has not moved dramatically since adopting combined 
reporting shows that adopting combined reporting will have little to no effect 
on how companies and tax practitioners view Wisconsin‘s corporate tax 
climate. 
Vermont adopted its combined reporting law in 2004, the first state to do 
so in over twenty years.
190
  The push toward combined reporting was the 
result of Governor James Douglas‘s call for a state tax regime that was ―more 
fair and equitable for all.‖191  Accordingly, the Vermont legislature began 
crafting a combined reporting system in early 2004.
192
  As part of its efforts, 
the Vermont Department of Taxes presented the Vermont House Committee 
on Ways and Means with a comprehensive report on combined reporting.
193
  
The report estimated that Vermont lost between $8.32 billion and $12.38 
billion annually due to the use of tax shelters and tax-avoidance strategies.
194
  
The Department also ―estimated that the additional revenue generated from 
enacting mandatory combined reporting would be sufficient‖ to offset 
combining the tax regime with a one percent reduction in the state corporate 
income tax rate.
195
 
In addition, the Committee heard testimony from both those in favor of 
combined reporting and those against.
196
  Among those in favor of combined 
reporting, Professor Richard Pomp testified that adopting combined reporting 
in conjunction with a reduction of the corporate tax rate was the right decision 
and one that he felt would improve the business climate in Vermont.
197
  In 
response to the common business climate argument against combined 
 
187. See BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1. 
188. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 396. 
189. Id.; BARRO, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.1. 
190. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5832 (2008); Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 390; see also 
Emily Dagostino, Is New Vermont Law a Sign of a Combined Reporting Comeback?, 2004 ST. TAX 
TODAY, Sept. 24, 2004 (noting that combined reporting bills or amendments were introduced in 
seven other states in 2003 and 2004, which is the most legislative attention combined reporting has 
seen in twenty years). 
191. Vt. Gov. James Douglas, State-of-the-State Message, J. JOINT ASSEMBLY 6 (Jan. 6, 2004), 
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/journal/ja040106.htm. 
192. Cowan & Kakstys, supra note 162, at 392. 
193. Id. at 392–93. 
194. Id. at 393. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 399–405. 
197. Id. at 400. 
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reporting, Professor Pomp urged Committee members not to let such 
arguments influence their decision, as ―[business climate] can mean whatever 
you want it to mean.‖198  He went on to note that ―combined reporting, and 
taxes in general, have very little impact on business decisions and economic 
growth.  Businesses do consider taxes, but they weigh other factors—such as 
an educated workforce, infrastructure, labor costs—much more in deciding 
where to locate.‖199 
In opposition to combined reporting, the Committee heard from two 
groups—Associated Industries of Vermont and the Council on State 
Taxation.
200
  Both groups focused their arguments on the traditional 
arguments against combined reporting: complexity and a weakening of the 
business climate.
201
  The Committee, however, was not persuaded by the 
opposition arguments, as the Department, Professor Pomp, and the other 
arguments in favor had sufficiently addressed the limited arguments against 
combined reporting presented by the two groups.
202
 
Consequently, combined reporting may have a positive effect on 
Wisconsin‘s business climate, not a negative effect as is often assumed when 
one talks of increasing taxes paid by corporations.  In reality, the actual effect 
of combined reporting is not an increase in taxes; it simply requires 
corporations to pay the taxes they should be paying in the first place.  Any 
extra revenue collected by the state can then be put toward improving the 
business climate in Wisconsin through increased and enhanced public services 
and a betterment of the state in general. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Adopting combined reporting is a necessary step for Wisconsin‘s future.  
Although the business climate in Wisconsin could use improvement, allowing 
corporations to continue to shirk their share of the responsibility to pay for 
valuable public services is not a solution.  Attacking tax avoidance loopholes 
 
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. Id. at 401–02. 
201. Id. at 402–05. 
202. Id. at 405.  While Vermont is an example of a state that enacted combined reporting 
despite concern over its effect on the business climate, Vermont‘s law may be differentiated because 
of its concurrent reduction in the corporate tax rate.  Id. at 408.  Such a reduction most likely 
softened the blow for those traditionally against combined reporting, such as manufacturing groups 
and those with conservative tax views.  As the Vermont Department of Taxes noted to the Vermont 
House Committee on Ways and Means, adopting combined reporting simply to raise revenues looks 
like ―a revenue grab‖ and tends to be ―a tough sell from a political standpoint.‖  Id. at 397.  Indeed, 
the Committee ―felt it had seized the high ground because it was using the revenue from combined 
reporting to reduce the corporate tax rate,‖ which insulated the Committee from anti-business 
charges.  Id. at 405. 
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on a case-by-case basis is also not a good strategy, as each litigation costs the 
state money and does not guarantee success.  Additionally, the related-entity 
addback provision recently added to the Wisconsin Statutes is a step in the 
right direction, but it will not stop all tax avoidance strategies currently at use 
in Wisconsin. 
Combined reporting would eliminate the Wal-Mart REIT loophole, as 
well as the PIC, intangible holding company, and transfer pricing loopholes.  
In addition, it would nullify most of the other tax avoidance strategies 
currently used in Wisconsin today.  Although combined reporting is not a 
perfect system, it is a better system.  Once in place, a combined reporting 
system will guarantee that the task of ―slicing [the] shadow‖203 of corporate 
income will be a fair and just process that requires corporations doing 
business in Wisconsin to help pay for the resources they value.  Therefore, 
Wisconsin should adopt combined reporting and use the additional revenue to 
help develop valuable public services, such as providing quality education and 
training for a skilled workforce, which will help draw corporations to this 
state. 
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